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The Framers’ Establishment Clause: 
How High the Wall? 
J. Clifford Wallace∗  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Our nation’s motto is “In God we trust.”1 The motto, taken 
from the closing bars of our national anthem, “The Star Spangled 
Banner,”2 has appeared on United States coins and currency since 
18653 and is emblazoned over the entrance to the Senate Chamber 
in the Capitol.4 When we pledge allegiance to our flag, we proclaim 
“one Nation under God.”5 Public officials complete their oaths of 
office with “the final supplication, ‘So help me God.’”6 Both houses 
of Congress have paid chaplains,7 who begin each day’s session with 
prayer.8 Likewise, the Supreme Court crier, since Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s tenure, has invoked God’s grace on the Court each time it 
takes the bench.9 
Religion has long been a part of our country’s fabric.10 The pos-
sibility of restraints on the development of this religious heritage was 
an early concern of our forefathers.11 In 1791, the First Amendment 
 
 ∗ Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I have 
not sought for nor received the views of my court and write only for myself. 
 1. 36 U.S.C. § 186 (1994). 
 2. See 36 U.S.C. § 170 (1994); see also H.R. REP. NO. 84-1959, at 1 (1956), reprinted 
in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3720, 3720 (quoting national anthem as stating, “Then conquer we 
must when our cause it is just, / And this be our motto—‘In God is our trust’”). 
 3. See Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 100, 13 Stat. 517, 518. The motto is now mandatory 
on all coin and currency. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5112(d), (e), 5114(b) (1994). 
 4. See 100 CONG. REC. 6348 (1954) (statement of Sen. Ferguson). 
 5. See 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1994). 
 6. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1963). 
 7. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 61d, 84-2 (1994) (listing current House and Senate Chaplains’ sala-
ries). 
 8. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 213. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (“We are a religious people 
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”). 
 11. See JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPER-
IMENT 37–39 (2000). 
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to the Constitution was ratified. With regard to religion, this time-
honored amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof . . . .”12 This phrase consists of two clauses, which some sug-
gest have contradictory meanings to an extent.13 One clause, the 
“Free Exercise Clause,” gives individuals the right to worship as they 
choose without the fear of governmental regulation or reprisal.14 The 
other clause, the “Establishment Clause,” has proven to be more dif-
ficult for the courts of this land to explain or understand. 
Several Supreme Court cases interpret the Establishment Clause 
as creating an impenetrable wall that prohibits any relations between 
a government and the churches within its borders.15 However, no-
where in the Constitution are the words “separation of church and 
state” to be found.16 Those of us who earn our living in the legal sys-
tem have sometimes coined phrases that help us to understand prin-
ciples underlying the various doctrines with which we work. At 
times, these phrases, such as “separation of church and state,” are so 
widely and repeatedly used that we begin to substitute the phrase for 
the actual underlying rule. Many legal historians believe that the 
courts have misunderstood the Framers’ intent in drafting the Estab-
lishment Clause.17 It has been argued that a more realistic phrase to 
describe the original meaning of the Establishment Clause would be 
“no preferential treatment for a particular church.”18 Some scholars 
assert that the Supreme Court itself has admitted to misreading the 
historical meaning of the Establishment Clause, yet instead of fol-
 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 13. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-2, at 1157 (2d 
ed. 1988). 
 14. See id. 
 15. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 
1 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 16. In fact, none of the twenty drafts of the religion clauses generated by the state ratifi-
cation process and the First Congress contained this or similar phrases. Among state constitu-
tions, only the Constitution of Utah (1896) contained such a guarantee. See WITTE, supra 
note 11, at 91–92. 
 17. See ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT 
AND CURRENT FICTION (1982); CLIFTON BRYAN KRUSE, THE HISTORICAL MEANING AND 
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION CLAUSE OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT (1963). 
 18. See generally Robert L. Cord, Church-State Separation: Restoring the “No Preference” 
Doctrine of the First Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129 (1986); Wallace v. Jaffree, 
472 U.S. 38, 91–114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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lowing the Framers’ intentions, the Court has perpetuated a con-
temporary rendition of the First Amendment that erroneously bars 
any mixing of church and state.19 
I have long advocated interpreting the Constitution and the Bill 
of Rights based upon the intent of the Constitutional Founders 
(Founders) and of the Framers of the Bill of Rights (Framers).20 
Such an approach, I hold, follows naturally from the constitutional 
principle of separation of powers, as well as from the intrinsic value 
of democracy.21 The people ratified the First Amendment through 
their chosen delegates,22 who were commissioned with the responsi-
bility of setting social policy. Those delegates devoted a substantial 
amount of study, debate, and compromise to arrive at a final draft of 
the First Amendment.23 Looking to original intent also “provides 
[greater] predictability and stability” in matters of constitutional 
law.24 Recognizing Congress’s role as policy setter and lawmaker, the 
courts have traditionally looked to history in religion cases to aid in 
their interpretation of the amendments.25 But in its historical analy-
sis,26 the Supreme Court has ignored certain crucial facts, creating a 
distorted picture of what the Framers intended. 
In this article, I reexamine what the members of Congress meant 
by the Establishment Clause when they prohibited “an establishment 
of religion.” Part II reviews aspects of the broader context in which 
the Constitution and First Amendment were drafted. Part III focuses 
 
 19. See John S. Baker, Jr., The Establishment Clause as Intended: No Preference Among 
Sects and Pluralism in a Large Commercial Republic, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL 
MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 41, 41–42, 45–47 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 
1991) (citing Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)). 
 20. See, e.g., J. Clifford Wallace, A Two Hundred Year Old Constitution in Modern Soci-
ety, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1575, 1579–80, 1586 (1983) [hereinafter Constitution in Modern Soci-
ety]; J. Clifford Wallace, The Jurisprudence of Judicial Restraint: A Return to the Moorings, 50 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1, 11–14 (1981) [hereinafter Judicial Restraint]. 
 21. See Judicial Restraint, supra note 20, at 2–8. 
 22. See Resolution of the First Congress Submitting Twelve Amendments to the Constitu-
tion, in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN 
STATES 1063–65 (1927) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS] (containing original amendments sent to 
the states and action taken thereon). 
 23. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 93–98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing congressional 
debate and compromise on Establishment Clause); MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND 
POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6–14 (1978). 
 24. Constitution in Modern Society, supra note 20, at 1580. 
 25. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425–30 (1962); Everson v. Board of Educ., 
330 U.S. 1, 9–15 (1947). 
 26. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 9–15. 
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on the text of the Establishment Clause and discusses the beliefs, ac-
tions, and statements of the Founders and Framers. This section also 
examines the role played by Thomas Jefferson during this period. 
Part IV applies the principles of interpretation gleaned from the 
analysis in Parts II and III to three cases recently decided by the Su-
preme Court: Mitchell v. Helms,27 Santa Fe Independent School Dis-
trict v. Doe,28 and Board of Regents v. Southworth.29 
II. CHURCH AND STATE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Throughout history, world and national leaders have turned to 
deity in prayer for guidance.30 Both Western and Eastern leaders31 
have looked to their god, or gods, for approval of acts such as the 
crowning of kings,32 going to war,33 returning from war (whether in 
success or defeat),34 the establishment of borders,35 the founding of 
cities,36 and for routine matters, such as determining the compensa-
tion to be received by one whose ox has been gored by the ox of his 
 
 27. 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 28. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 29. 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
 30. See CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE HIGHER LAWS: ORIGINS OF MODERN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1–3 (1994). 
 31. See id. at 1. During the Golden Age of Chinese Philosophy, sages such as Confucius 
and Mencius affirmed “that ultimate political authority is in God alone, with temporal rulers 
being delegated only some of His power, and always subject to the ‘law of God,’ or, as some-
times expressed, ‘the law of Heaven.’” Id. (footnotes omitted). The Chinese philosophers pro-
claimed that the basic principle of the “Will of Heaven” or “Mandate of Heaven” was that 
“rulers were but stewards for the people.” Id.  
 32. See 1 Samuel 15:1 (King James) (“Samuel also said unto Saul, The Lord sent me to 
anoint thee to be king over his people, over Israel: now therefore hearken thou unto the voice 
of the words of the Lord.”). 
 33. Herodotus recounts that at the battle at Plataea between the Greeks and the Per-
sians the Greeks would not engage in fighting until the sacrifices were favorable. HERODOTUS, 
THE HISTORY 639–40 (David Grene trans., Univ. Chicago Press 1987). 
 34. See Deuteronomy 20:4 (King James) (“For the Lord your God is he that goeth with 
you, to fight for you against your enemies, to save you.”). 
 35. See Numbers 34:1–12 (King James). 
 36. According to one legend, Romulus and Remus felt impressed to found a city at the 
spot where they had been abandoned as infants, and both “determined to ask the tutelary gods 
of the countryside to declare by augury which of them should govern the new town.” LIVY, 
THE EARLY HISTORY OF ROME, 39–40 (Aubrey de Sélincourt trans., Penguin Books 1960). 
Remus saw six vultures while Romulus saw twelve. Their followers began fighting over the 
meaning of the two omens, and in the struggle, Remus was killed. Romulus named the new 
city after himself, Rome, and offered sacrifices to the gods. See id. at 40. 
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neighbor.37 Our Founders’ predecessors also regularly petitioned 
God for assistance; these prayers included asking for his aid in relo-
cating to the New World.38 The Mayflower Compact, as well as the 
charters of many colonies, specifically asked for divine guidance in 
political endeavors.39 During the American Revolution and the 
founding era, religion continued to play a vital role in the political 
arena.40 At the start of the American Revolution in 1775, nine of the 
thirteen colonies had established churches.41 When the Constitu-
tional Convention began in 1787, five states still retained their estab-
lished faiths.42 State-established churches continued during the Con-
vention, state ratification, and acceptance of the First Amendment. 
Indeed, it was not until 1833, forty-six years after the Constitutional 
Convention and forty-two years after the First Amendment was rati-
fied, that Massachusetts disestablished the last state-sponsored 
church.43 The fact that these official state churches existed and con-
tinued to exist after the ratification of the First Amendment is strong 
evidence that the Framers meant the Establishment Clause to apply 
only to the federal government; the First Amendment left the states 
 
 37. See Exodus 21:35 (King James). 
 38. A great many of the early colonies were formed by dissident religious minorities who 
left Europe in order to escape powerful political systems. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 
U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (“A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came here from 
Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled them to support and attend govern-
ment-favored churches.”). 
 39. See DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 7 (1988) 
(“The political covenants written by English colonists in America lead us to the church cove-
nants written by radical Protestants in the late 1500s and early 1600s, and these in turn lead us 
back to the Covenant tradition of the Old Testament.”); CHARLES E. RICE, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND PUBLIC PRAYER: THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT 159–65 (1964) (discussing the 
Mayflower Compact and the charters of colonies in Virginia, Massachusetts, Maryland, Con-
necticut, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania). 
 40. See LUTZ, supra note 39, at 140 (“The prominence of ministers in the political lit-
erature of the period attests to the continuing influence of religion during the founding era.”). 
Lutz examined the public political literature written between 1760 and 1805. He found that 
the Bible was the most frequently cited book in that literature and that the peak period of bib-
lical citation occurred during the 1770s. Id. at 140–41. Lutz writes, “[a]pproximately 80 per-
cent of the political pamphlets published during the 1770s were reprinted sermons.” Id. at 
140, 142. 
 41. ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 36–37 (1964). 
 42. See CORD, supra note 17, at 4 (identifying Georgia, South Carolina, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire as still having state-established religions). 
 43. See id. 
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free to decide the propriety of having state churches.44 
Virginia’s experience in the disestablishment of an official state 
church is an important and oft-mentioned example. The Anglican 
Church was the established church in Virginia, and its ministers were 
paid by the state.45 Those who favored disestablishing the church 
were led by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.46 The two men 
wrote persuasive and powerful documents: Madison’s Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments47 and Jefferson’s Bill for 
Establishing Religious Freedom.48 Not only did the Framers of the 
First Amendment look to these documents, but so did the United 
States Supreme Court 150 years later in interpreting the Establish-
ment Clause.49 In reaction to Madison’s and Jefferson’s writings, 
Virginia disestablished its church.50 However, as we shall see, other 
evidence may be more indicative of the Framers’ intent for the 
Establishment Clause than these documents, written prior to the 
First Amendment’s ratification.51 
III. THE NONPREFERENTIALIST ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
A. From the Constitutional Convention to State Ratification 
Like their predecessors, the Founders were essentially religious 
people,52 and, not surprisingly, their religious beliefs influenced their 
political actions. The Declaration of Independence contains four ref-
 
 44. In 1808, Thomas Jefferson wrote, “Certainly no power to prescribe any religious 
exercise, or to assume authority in religious discipline, has been delegated to the general gov-
ernment. It must then rest with the state, as far as it can be in any human authority.” CORD, 
supra note 17, at 14. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See RICE, supra note 39, at 32. 
 47. The precise meaning of this document remains in dispute. Some scholars have seen 
the “Memorial” as evidencing Madison’s objections to any state aid to religion. On the other 
hand, it can also be argued that Madison was opposed to Virginia’s law because it was dis-
criminatory and gave improper preference to Christianity. See CORD, supra note 17, at 20. 
 48. See RICE, supra note 39, at 32; CORD, supra note 17, at 244–50 (containing text of 
these two documents). 
 49. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1947). 
 50. The Anglican church was established in Virginia in 1609 and disestablished in 1786. 
See CORD, supra note 17, at 4. 
 51. See infra Part III.B–C. 
 52. All of the fifty-five Founders, with the exception of three, or possibly five, were 
members of an organized church. See M.E. BRADFORD, A WORTHY COMPANY viii (1982). 
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erences to God,53 yet its author, Thomas Jefferson, is the same man 
who later wrote that a “wall of separation” should be erected be-
tween church and state.54 In 1777, the Continental Congress im-
ported 20,000 Bibles for use in the United States, and in 1782, it 
commissioned an American edition of the Bible.55 
During the Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franklin, a 
man often cited as being opposed to any state connection to relig-
ion,56 proposed that each day the Convention begin with prayer.57 
He proclaimed that calling on divine assistance would aid the resolu-
tion of the serious matters before the Convention. Dr. Franklin, ad-
dressing President Washington, stated: 
I have lived, Sir, a long time, and the longer I live, the more con-
vincing proofs I see of this truth—that God Governs in the affairs of 
men. . . . I firmly believe this . . . . 
 I therefore beg leave to move—that henceforth prayers implor-
ing the assistance of Heaven, and its blessings on our deliberations, 
be held in this Assembly every morning before we proceed to busi-
ness, and that one or more of the Clergy of this City be requested 
to officiate in that Service.58 
 
 53. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1, 2, 5 (U.S. 1776) (speaking of 
“God,” the “Creator,” “the Supreme Judge of the world,” and “the protection of Divine 
Providence”). 
 54. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and 
Stephen S. Nelson, A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, in the State of Connecti-
cut (Jan. 1, 1802), reproduced in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518–19 (Saul K. Padover ed., 2d 
ed. 1969). Strict separationists must rely on a letter written to Baptist Church leaders, who had 
been leaders in the disestablishment of the Anglican Church. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AMERICAN HISTORY 824 (Richard B. Morris & Jeffrey B. Morris eds., 6th ed. 1982). 
 55. See Rodney K. Smith, Getting Off on the Wrong Foot and Back on Again: A Reex-
amination of the History of the Framing of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and a 
Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569, 600 (1984) 
(citing STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 41, at 85). However, the First Congress did not act on 
petitions it received from various religious groups to standardize the text of the Bible. See Wil-
liam C. diGiacomantonio, To Form the Character of the American People: Public Support for the 
Arts, Sciences, and Morality in the First Federal Congress, in INVENTING CONGRESS: ORIGINS 
AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 208, 233 (Kenneth R. Bowling & 
Donald R. Kennon eds., 1999) [hereinafter INVENTING CONGRESS]. 
 56. See, e.g., Paul E. Salamanca, The Role of Religion in Public Life and Official Pressure 
to Participate in Alcoholics Anonymous, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 1093, 1101–02 (1997). 
 57. See RICE, supra note 39, at 36–39. 
 58. Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 as Reported by James Madison, in 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 22, at 295–96. Some suggest that the story has less force as evidence 
of the Founders’ thoughts on church and state matters since Franklin’s motion for prayers did 
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Franklin’s request that “one or more of the Clergy” be asked to par-
ticipate suggests that Franklin was concerned about not giving any 
one religion preferential treatment; his advocating of prayer during 
the Convention does not suggest that he favored an absolute separa-
tion of church and state.  
The Constitution that left the Convention contained no specific 
protections for the individual and his or her choice of religion. The 
only clause in the main body of the Constitution that had anything 
to do with religion was one prohibiting any religious test as a qualifi-
cation for public office at the national level.59 During the state ratifi-
cation process, the Constitution’s lack of a Bill of Rights, including 
any guarantee regarding religious liberty, generated significant con-
troversy.60 Federalists gave assurances that Congress did not have au-
thority over subjects, such as religion, that were not enumerated in 
the Constitution. However, only four states agreed to ratify without 
first being promised that the First Congress would draft a bill of 
rights.61 Seven states proposed provisions for a federal bill of rights; 
six of these proposed religious liberty clauses.62 Virginia, for example, 
proposed “that no particular religious sect or society ought to be fa-
vored or established, by law, in preference to others.”63 State ratify-
ing conventions in Maryland, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode 
Island recommended similar language. Such proposals manifested 
these states’ concern that a federal religion might be established; in 
other words, they feared that the federal government might give 
preference to one of the many particular sects then existing in the 
states.64 Although during ratification Madison joined with the feder-
 
not carry. However, Madison’s notes from the Convention show that lack of funds to pay a 
chaplain, not antipathy to government-organized prayer, may have been the real reason for the 
omission of prayer. Id. at 296. 
 59. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHMENT TO 
POWER: HOW JAMES MADISON USED THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO SAVE THE CONSTITUTION 137 
(1997). Indeed, the Constitutional Convention was characterized by the absence of discussions 
about religious liberty. See Smith, supra note 55, at 601. 
 60. See WITTE, supra note 11, at 63. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 659 (Jona-
than Elliot ed., rep. ed., Burt Franklin 1987) [hereinafter DEBATES]. 
 64. See CORD, supra note 17, at 6–7. For instance, New York proposed an amendment 
reading, “no religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by law in preference to 
others.” 1 DEBATES, supra note 63, at 328. For information on the many religious sects in the 
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alists in arguing that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary,65 he grew con-
cerned that without one antifederalists would withdraw all support 
from the new Constitution and thereby hinder the progress of the 
infant nation.66 Thus, as a member of the First Congress, he drew 
upon the state proposals and presented to Congress the first draft of 
the Bill of Rights.67 
B. Reading the Establishment Clause 
Madison’s initial draft of the Establishment Clause clearly ex-
presses a no-preference attitude toward religion. It reads, “nor shall 
any national religion be established.”68 Despite assertions that Madi-
son in his Memorial and Remonstrance argued against all state aid to 
religion,69 his obvious concern in this first draft was that no church 
should be established by the federal government or raised in status 
by it above another church; he wanted the multiplicity of religious 
sects in the United States to flourish.70 Madison was also working to 
address the concern expressed by the states during the ratification 
process that the “necessary and proper clause” of Article I, Section 8 
would induce Congress to form a national church.71 Further, it is re-
corded in congressional annals that Madison “apprehended the 
meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a re-
ligion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel 
men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience.”72 
After debate and compromise, the Establishment Clause as we 
know it today ultimately passed both Houses of Congress and finally 
 
United States at the time, see LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 93–95 (rev. ed. 
1967). 
 65. See Theodore Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Congress and the Schools: An Histori-
cal Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1395, 1406 (1966). 
 66. See GOLDWIN, supra note 59, at 71–73; MALBIN, supra note 23, at 5. Madison may 
also have been concerned that his staunch Baptist supporters, who strongly favored adding a 
guarantee of religious freedom, would fail to rally behind him in the first federal election con-
test, in which he was running against James Monroe. See R.B. Bernstein, A New Matrix for 
National Politics: The First Federal Elections, 1788–90, in INVENTING CONGRESS, supra note 
55, at 109, 130–31. 
 67. See WITTE, supra note 11, at 65. 
 68. MALBIN, supra note 23, at 4 (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 
1789)). 
 69. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. 
 70. See PFEFFER, supra note 64, at 93–95; GOLDWIN, supra note 59, at 72–73. 
 71. See CORD, supra note 17, at 9. 
 72. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). 
15WAL-FIN.DOC 5/23/01  7:34 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
764 
gained the necessary approval by the states. Numerous jurists and 
scholars have addressed the actual House debates on the First 
Amendment.73 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s conclusions concerning the 
First Congress’s debates on the First Amendment are worth reciting: 
The evil to be aimed at, so far as those who spoke [during the First 
Congress’s debates on the First Amendment] were concerned, ap-
pears to have been the establishment of a national church, and per-
haps the preference of one religious sect over another; but it was 
definitely not concerned about whether the Government might aid 
all religions evenhandedly.74 
C. Actions of the Framers 
Unless the Framers were extremely hypocritical and unwilling to 
practice what they preached, a close scrutiny of their actions near the 
time of and subsequent to the ratification of the First Amendment 
reveals important insight as to the meaning they attached to the Es-
tablishment Clause. The First Amendment was approved in the 
House of Representatives by a vote of thirty-seven to fourteen.75 On 
the same day, September 25, 1789,76 the House followed a practice 
begun during the Revolution77 and proposed a resolution requesting 
President George Washington to issue a Thanksgiving Day Procla-
mation, asking the nation to set aside a “day of public humiliation 
and prayer.”78 The debate surrounding this resolution is particularly 
striking. A South Carolina Antifederalist, Thomas Tudor Tucker, 
opposed the motion and asserted that “it was ‘a business with which 
Congress ha[s] nothing to do; it is a religious matter, and, as such, is 
proscribed by us.’”79 However, even after hearing this argument, the 
 
 73. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 93–100 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 
MALBIN, supra note 23, at 6–17; Baker, supra note 19, at 42–45. 
 74. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 75. See GOLDWIN, supra note 59, at 166–67. 
 76. See M.E. BRADFORD, ORIGINAL INTENTIONS: ON THE MAKING AND 
RATIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 93 (1993); diGiacomantonio, supra 
note 55, at 230–31. 
 77. See STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 41, at 504. 
 78. See Baker, supra note 19, at 42–43. 
 79. diGiacomantonio, supra note 55, at 231 (quoting 11 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, at 1500–01 (Charlene Bangs 
Bickford et al. eds., 1992)). 
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resolution passed by a great majority.80 Washington, who had served 
as the president of the Constitutional Convention, issued the proc-
lamation without any apparent concern that he might be mixing 
government and religion. The first line of Washington’s proclama-
tion reads, “Whereas it is the duty of all nations to acknowledge the 
providence of Almighty God, to obey His will, to be grateful for His 
benefits, and humbly to implore His protection and favor . . . .”81 Of 
the Framers or Founders who later became Presidents, three issued 
proclamations calling for prayer and thanksgiving. Washington issued 
at least two,82 Adams at least two,83 and Madison at least four.84 
In addition to urging the Thanksgiving Proclamation, the House 
of Representatives authorized the use of its hall for religious ser-
vices,85 and the First Congress established a Congressional Chaplain 
system.86 An annual salary of $500 was to be paid for public prayers 
in Congress.87 The Congress further authorized the President “by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate” to appoint a chaplain 
for the “military establishment of the United States.”88 In 1789, the 
First Congress reenacted the Northwest Ordinance, which provided 
that “[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge” were necessary to good 
government and happiness.89 It also stated that schools should pro-
mote religious and related values as part of their curriculum.90  
In 1790, a group of Quakers petitioned the First Congress to 
enact antislavery regulation.91 Their efforts were met by vigorous op-
position by delegations from Southern states.92 Several Southern 
congressmen questioned the petition because of the religious affilia-
 
 80. See id.; BRADFORD, supra note 76, at 98. 
 81. 1 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 56 (1896). 
 82. See id. at 56, 171–72. 
 83. See id. at 258–60, 274–76. 
 84. See 2 RICHARDSON, supra note 81, at 498, 517–18, 543, 545–46. 
 85. See STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 41, at 90. 
 86. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787–88 (1983). 
 87. See id. at 788 & n.7. 
 88. Act for Raising and Adding Another Regiment to the Military Establishment of the 
United States, and for Making Farther Provision for the Protection of the Frontiers, ch. 28, 
§ 5, 1 Stat. 222 (1791); see also H.R. REP. NO. 33-124 (1854). 
 89. Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the River Ohio, 
ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789) (reenacting Northwest Ordinance of 1787). 
 90. See id. 
 91. See diGiacomantonio, supra note 55, at 237. 
 92. See id. 
15WAL-FIN.DOC 5/23/01  7:34 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
766 
tion of those who brought it and further disparaged the Quakers’ 
prayer on the grounds that “religious scruples” could not be a basis 
for congressional policy.93 Significantly, these congressmen made 
these fatuous arguments to the other members of Congress by 
couching their concern in the language of nonpreferential treatment 
for, and not of outright disengagement from, religious organiza-
tions. Congressman Tucker, for example, stated, “‘If we are to pay 
attention to the religious scruples of one sect, we are equally bound 
to pay attention to all.’”94 
Similar rhetoric was also employed during the third session of the 
First Congress in arguing against Quaker petitions that asked for ex-
emptions from military service. Again, attention to the language em-
ployed in the debates demonstrates that those who opposed the peti-
tions did not rely for their arguments on a “wall of separation” but 
rather claimed that the petitions would improperly prefer one relig-
ion, the Quakers, over all other religions. Congressman Jackson as-
serted, “‘[W]e could not more effectually encourage that religion by 
making it the religion of the land, than we should by annexing these 
privileges to it.’”95 He also stated, “‘The constitution places all relig-
ions on an equal footing.’”96 “‘What right then, have we, the mere 
creatures of the constitution, to create and give rank and stability to 
one church more than another?’”97 
Several treaties provide further evidence that the Establishment 
Clause does not create an absolute separation of church and state. 
President Washington concluded a treaty with the Oneida, Tus-
corora, and Stockbridge Native American Tribes pursuant to which 
the United States was to pay $1,000 toward the building of a church 
at Oneida.98 In 1803, President Jefferson proposed a treaty, which 
was ratified by the Senate, providing for a church to be built for the 
Kaskaskia Tribe out of government funds.99 The church was to be 
 
 93. Id. at 238. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 241. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See A Treaty Between the United States and the Oneida, Tuscorora, and Stock-
bridge Indians, Dwelling in the County of the Oneidas, Dec. 2, 1794, art. IV, 7 Stat. 47, 48 
(1785). 
 99. See A Treaty Between the United States of America and the Kaskaskia Tribe of Indi-
ans, Aug. 13, 1803, art. III, 7 Stat. 78, 79 (1803). 
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Roman Catholic with a yearly stipend paid to the priest.100 President 
James Monroe, Madison’s former Secretary of State, entered into a 
treaty with the Wyandots and other Native Americans and, because 
of their attachment to the Catholic Religion, granted land “to the 
rector of the Catholick [sic] church of St. Anne of Detroit” for the 
use of a church.101 A treaty with the Osage Tribe signed in 1825 in-
cluded a land grant “for the benefit of [the Harmony Missionary es-
tablishment]” in Missouri, “so long as said Missions shall be usefully 
employed in teaching” the tribe.102 From 1796 to 1804, Congress 
passed laws that in effect subsidized an evangelical Christian sect to 
proselytize among the Indians in the Territory of Ohio.103 
These acts by the Framers and their successors shed light on their 
intent in adopting the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment. Subsequent court decisions cannot rewrite this history. 
D. Jefferson and the Establishment Clause 
A comment must be made about Thomas Jefferson. The Su-
preme Court has heavily relied on Jefferson’s writings concerning 
church-state matters, especially his statement that the Establishment 
Clause erected “a wall of separation between church and State.”104 
Interestingly, however, Jefferson was neither a delegate to the Con-
vention in Philadelphia nor a member of the First Congress; in fact, 
Jefferson was out of the country at the time.105 Thus, he was neither 
a Founder nor a Framer. His “wall of separation” comment was 
made in a letter fourteen years after the First Congress passed the 
First Amendment—hardly contemporary with the adoption of the 
First Amendment.106 
It is true that Jefferson was a leader in the separation of church 
and state crusades.107 In Virginia, Madison introduced Jefferson’s 
“Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,” which became law in 
 
 100. See id. 
 101. Articles of a Treaty, Sept. 29, 1817, art. 16, 7 Stat. 160, 166 (1817). 
 102. Articles of a Treaty, June 2, 1825, art. 10, 7 Stat. 240, 242–43 (1825). 
 103. See PROGRESS OF THE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED BRETHREN IN PROPAGATING THE 
GOSPEL AMONG THE INDIANS, S. DOC. NO. 17-189 (1822), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 372 (1834). 
 104. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (citation omitted). 
 105. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 106. See id. 
 107. See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text. 
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1786.108 On the same day, however, Madison also introduced a bill 
by Jefferson that called for severely punishing “Sabbath Breakers.”109 
Later, Jefferson, as president of the University of Virginia, proposed 
nonsectarian religious study as part of the university curriculum, and 
he invited sects to conduct religious exercises on the campus with 
the qualification that all sects have equal access.110 He also thought it 
appropriate for the Charlottesville courthouse to be used as a “com-
mon temple” on a rotating basis by the churches in town.111 Is this 
an advocate of a “wall of separation,” let alone, as suggested by the 
Supreme Court, a “high and impregnable wall”?112 Some who have 
examined Jefferson’s actions in church-state affairs suggest that his 
concern was not church-state intermingling in general but the fed-
eral government’s involvement in religion and that he believed the 
Constitution left the states free “to develop what they deemed to be 
the proper relationship with religion.”113 Even with Jefferson’s aver-
sion to federal involvement with religion, however, the Capitol was 
used for religious services during Jefferson’s presidency,114 and, as 
mentioned earlier, his administration negotiated a treaty with the 
Kaskaskia Tribe, which provided for building a Roman Catholic 
church and paying the priest a yearly stipend with government 
funds.115 These acts better describe Jefferson’s views than a throw-
away line in a letter to a small, New England church committee.116 
E. Early Commentators on the Establishment Clause 
One last source that is useful in understanding the original mean-
ing of the Establishment Clause is the statements of early constitu-
tional commentators. Justice Joseph Story, a long-time member of 
the Court and professor at Harvard Law School, wrote: “The real 
object of the [First] [A]mendment was . . . to prevent any national 
 
 108. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 109. See Joel F. Hansen, Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: A Historical Ex-
amination of the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 BYU L. REV. 645, 666 (quoting 2 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 556 (J. Boyd ed., 1950)). 
 110. See id. at 669–72. 
 111. See id. at 667–68. 
 112. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
 113. Hansen, supra note 109, at 673. 
 114. See STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 41, at 90. 
 115. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
 116. See supra note 54. 
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ecclesiastical establishment which should give to a hierarchy the ex-
clusive patronage of the national government.”117 Likewise, Thomas 
Cooley, a later contemporary of Justice Story, emphasized that the 
First Amendment prevented “discrimination in favor of any one de-
nomination or sect.”118 These statements support the evidence de-
scribed earlier that the Framers intended the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment to forbid a national religion and sectarian pref-
erence. 
IV. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TODAY 
Today, the Establishment Clause remains a source of substantial 
litigation and is hotly debated. Cases involving the constitutionality 
of prayers or scripture reading in public schools,119 legislative chap-
lains,120 tax exemption for church property,121 Sunday closing laws,122 
tuition credits for parents who send their children to private church 
schools,123 and municipal Nativity scenes124—to mention just a few—
have inevitably found their way to the nation’s highest Court. 
Last year was no exception. The Court addressed the Establish-
ment Clause in three cases dealing with religion and public educa-
tion. First, in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,125 the 
Court used the Establishment Clause to strike down a local school 
board policy that permitted “‘student-led, student-initiated prayer at 
[high school] football games.’”126 In Mitchell v. Helms,127 a fractured 
Court held that the Establishment Clause did not bar the use of fed-
eral funds channeled through state and local educational agencies for 
“‘services, materials, and equipment,’” such as library books,  
 
 
 117. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 631–32 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1994). 
 118. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 471 
(De Capo 1972). 
 119. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 38 (1985); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203 (1963). 
 120. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 121. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
 122. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
 123. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
 124. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 125. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 126. Id. at 301 (citation omitted). 
 127. 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
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computers, and audio-visual equipment, that are “‘secular, neutral, 
and nonideological.’”128 
Another case, while technically a free speech case, built upon a 
previous Establishment Clause case. Five years ago, in Rosenberger v. 
Rector of the University of Virginia,129 the Court held that a religious 
student newspaper at a public university could, without violating the 
Establishment Clause, apply for and receive money from a university 
program that provided funds for the printing of student publications 
if the program was viewpoint-neutral.130 In Board of Regents v. 
Southworth,131 the Court considered “the antecedent question, ac-
knowledged but unresolved in Rosenberger: whether a public univer-
sity may require its students to pay a fee which creates the mecha-
nism for the extracurricular speech in the first instance.”132 The 
Court answered yes, holding that the use of mandatory student ac-
tivity fees at a public university to fund extracurricular student activi-
ties that furthered the university’s broad educational mission was 
constitutional, even though some of the funded organizations en-
gaged in political and ideological expression offensive to some stu-
dents, because the activity fee program was viewpoint-neutral.133 
What might have happened in these cases if the nonpreferentialist 
Establishment Clause described above134—no federal church and no 
preferential treatment—had been applied?135 In Santa Fe, the high 
school prayer case, the outcome might have been different and the 
school board policy upheld: praying at a football game is not the es-
tablishment of a national religion, and since the policy required 
“‘nonsectarian and nonproselytizing’” prayers,136 it probably would 
not have given preference to one church. The dissent, written by 
 
 128. Id. at 802 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7372(a)(1)). 
 129. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 130. See id. at 837–46. 
 131. 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
 132. Id. at 233. 
 133. See id. at 229–30. 
 134. See supra Part III. 
 135. I wish to make it clear that these thoughts do not foretell my vote on First Amend-
ment issues. By my oath, I am bound to follow the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First 
Amendment—and I will do so scrupulously. Nevertheless, it is informative to review the intent 
of those who wrote and voted upon the First Amendment. This I have tried to do in an objec-
tive fashion. 
 136. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 298 n.6 (2000) (quoting school 
policy). 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, stated, “Neither the holding nor the tone of 
the [majority] opinion is faithful to the meaning of the Establish-
ment Clause, when it is recalled that George Washington himself, at 
the request of the very Congress which passed the Bill of Rights pro-
claimed a day of ‘public thanksgiving . . . .’”137 In Mitchell, the edu-
cational materials case, the Court would likely have reached the same 
result and upheld the federal act in question, since that act does not 
establish a federal religion or prefer one religious sect above an-
other.138 The plurality opinion,139 written by Justice Thomas, con-
tains several passages that evince attention to the principles of neu-
trality found in the Establishment Clause.140 For example, Justice 
Thomas stated: 
If a program offers permissible aid to the religious (including the 
pervasively sectarian), the areligious, and the irreligious, it is a mys-
tery which view of religion the government has established, and 
thus a mystery what the constitutional violation would be. The per-
vasively sectarian recipient has not received any special favor, and it 
is most bizarre that the Court would . . . reserve special hostility for 
those who take their religion seriously . . . .141  
Finally, to the extent Southworth, the university free speech case, 
built upon the Establishment Clause principles in Rosenberger, the 
result would probably have been the same because the funds gener-
ated by the student activity fee program were not to be used to favor 
one religious organization above another.142 
 
 137. Id. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 138. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 802 (2000) (plurality) (stating that the Educa-
tion Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 required “‘services, materials, and equip-
ment’” provided to private schools must be “‘secular, neutral, and nonideological’”). 
 139. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy joined in this opinion. 
See id. at 794. 
 140. Indeed this fact was of great concern to Justice O’Connor and Justice Breyer, who 
concurred in the judgment, and to the dissenters. Justice O’Connor stated, “Reduced to its 
essentials, the plurality’s rule states that government aid to religious schools does not have the 
effect of advancing religion so long as the aid is offered on a neutral basis and the aid is secular 
in content.” Id. at 837 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Souter in dissent wrote, “What is 
more important is the view revealed in the plurality opinion, which espouses a new conception 
of neutrality as a practically sufficient test of constitutionality that would, if adopted by the 
Court, eliminate enquiry into a law’s effects.” Id. at 869 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 141. Id. at 827. 
 142. Board of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234 (2000) (stating that parties 
had stipulated that student fee program involved was viewpoint neutral). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
From this brief examination of the actions and words of the 
Framers of the First Amendment, it is clear that what they had in 
mind regarding the “establishment of religion” clause was that no 
federal church would be established and that Congress would not 
give preferential treatment to an individual sect. The Framers did not 
intend to inhibit religion, only to prevent Congress from favoring 
one over another. At the state level, citizens were left free to develop 
religious policy through representative democracy.143 The merits of a 
system providing for “separation of church and state” was not de-
cided by the First Amendment; rather, it specified only where that 
decision might be made. Based upon the original intent of the Fram-
ers, that forum was to be located in the several states, not in the fed-
eral courtroom.144 
I recognize that many do not share my view of Establishment 
Clause history and perhaps question its relevance in light of the dec-
ades of precedent that do not support such an interpretation. How-
ever, like others, I am optimistic that the Supreme Court may turn 
more toward the foundation upon which the Establishment Clause is 
based and apply an interpretation consistent with that foundation. 
Three Justices, led by the Chief Justice of the United States, have at 
least made this point last year in Santa Fe Independent School Dis-
trict.145 Perhaps others will follow. 
 
 143. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 109, at 645–46 (“As President of the United States, 
Thomas Jefferson refused to declare a national day of fasting, reasoning that the first amend-
ment had created ‘a wall of separation between church and State.’ As a Virginia legislator, 
however, he sponsored a bill giving the Governor the power to declare days of fasting and 
thanksgiving. . . . A careful study of Jefferson’s actions and utterances over the span of his life 
reveals that the Master of Monticello saw in the religion clauses of the first amendment more 
than a wall of separation between church and state; to him, they constituted a study in federal-
ism.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 144. I realize, of course, that the Supreme Court has, through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, incorporated the First Amendment such that it now applies to the states. See Everson v. 
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment Clause); 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (applying the Free Exercise Clause to the 
states). However, as Mark DeWolfe Howe has written, “[I]t seems to me extraordinarily diffi-
cult to take seriously the suggestion that the framers and the ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment believed that its adoption was going to have a significant effect upon the coun-
try’s religious institutions.” MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: 
RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 72 (1965). 
 145. 530 U.S. 290, 318–26 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., Thomas, J., Scalia, J., dissenting). 
